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Abstract—During the last years, Physically Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs) have become a very important research area in 
the field of hardware security due to their capability of generating 
volatile secret keys as well as providing a low-cost authentication. 
In this paper, an introduction to Physically Unclonable Functions 
is given, including their definition, properties and applications. 
Finally, as an example of how to design a PUF, the general 
structure of a ring oscillator PUF is presented. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The necessity of transmitting information in a secure way 
has existed for a long time; however, this necessity has increased 
greatly in the last years, due to the exponential rise in digital 
communications. Nowadays, huge amounts of confidential and 
sensitive information are being transmitted at high speed and 
guarantying confidentiality for all this data constitutes a big 
challenge.   
Traditionally, in the past, all the cryptographic primitives 
used to be analyzed only from a mathematical point of view, 
assuming that they behave as black boxes where possible 
attackers could only see the input and output, but not the internal 
operations. In the case of keyed primitives, it was usually 
assumed that it was easy to generate secure keys (secure key 
generation) and that they could be safely stored without being 
revealed (secure key storage). These assumptions, however, 
have proven to be very difficult to achieve from a practical point 
of view, requiring physical security measures. As a 
consequence, many security systems have been successfully 
attacked at a physical level. Regarding key generation, some 
systems have proven to be vulnerable [1], [2]. Regarding key 
storage, in order to be usable in an algorithm, keys are usually 
stored in non-volatile memories. Preventing well-equipped 
attackers to access to the content of these memories, have been 
proven to be very challenging [3], [4]. In this context, Physically 
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) constitute an excellent secure 
alternative to provide secure key generation and storage. 
The idea behind a PUF is to use uncontrollable physical 
variations introduced during the manufacturing process to create 
physical entities with a unique and uncontrollable behavior. 
PUFs present a challenge-response functionality that is used to  
 
Fig. 1. General scheme of a PUF with its properties 
evaluate them. When a stimulus (challenge) is applied to a PUF 
instance, it behaves in an unpredictable but repeatable way. If 
the same challenge is applied to a different PUF instance, the 
response is different even if it was manufactured using the exact 
same process (Fig. 1). Due to this uniqueness, PUFs can be used 
for authentication purposes. On the other hand, using fuzzy 
extractors, they can also be used for secure generation and 
storage. 
Although several systems that exploited physical properties 
for authentication purposes had been proposed before, the first 
definitions of the PUF concept were proposed in 2001 and 2002 
by Pappu [5], who introduced the term Physical One-Way 
Function (POWF), and Gassend et. al. [6] who used the term 
Physical Random Functions. However, despite being a 
relatively novel topic it has gained a lot of interest due to their 
applications in the field of hardware security. In this paper, we 
introduce the concept of PUF, explaining its main properties and 
applications for hardware security purposes. Furthermore, we 
present the scheme of the ring oscillator PUF (RO-PUF) to 
provide an example of how manufacturing process variations 
(which in this case produce small variations in the oscillation 
frequency) can be used to generate unique and measurable 
responses. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the 
definition of PUF as well as its main properties; Section III 
explains how it is possible to use PUFs for authentication, key 
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general structure of RO-PUF; finally, conclusions are presented 
in Section V. 
II. DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES OF PUFS 
A. Definition 
Along history, several definitions of PUFs have been given, 
attributing them certain properties. However, not all the 
proposed PUFs have met all these properties. In this work, we 
adopt the general definition proposed in [7]. This definition 
covers all the proposed PUFs and, at the same time, 
differentiates them from other constructions such as True 
Random Number Generators (TRNGs), RFID broadcasts or 
public-key signatures: 
Definition 1: A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a 
class of physical entities with a challenge-response functionality 
that exhibits identifiability and physical unclonability. 
In the following subsections, the properties of identifiability 
and physical unclonability will be briefly explained along with 
other properties that, can be useful for some applications. 
B. Reproducibility 
A PUF is said to be reproducible if any PUF instance always 
presents the same or very similar response when the same 
challenge is applied. The similarity between two responses for 
the same challenge and same PUF instance is called intra-
distance and is usually measured using the Hamming Distance 
(HD). If the response of a PUF consists of an m-bit output word, = ( , , … ) , the Hamming Distance between two 
responses , ′ is defined as: 
 = ⊕ ′  (1) 
The Hamming Distance is often expressed as a percentage.  
Usually, the intra-distance depends on ambient conditions 
such as temperature or supply voltage. In these cases, it is 
necessary to measure the intra-distance response for different 
ambient conditions. 
C. Uniqueness 
A PUF presents the uniqueness property if, when the same 
challenge is applied for different PUF instances, their responses 
are very different (i.e., their inter-distance is large). In a similar 
way as in the reproducibility case, inter-distances are often 
calculated using the Hamming Distance. However, uniqueness 
is usually evaluated under nominal operating conditions and is 
not evaluated under varying conditions. 
D. Identifiability 
A PUF presents the identifiability property if PUF instances 
can be identified by measuring their responses. To meet these 
requirements, the PUF must meet the properties of 
reproducibility and uniqueness. It must be noticed that, to be 
identifiable, a PUF does not need to present perfect 
reproducibility or perfect uniqueness. In practice, it is almost 
impossible to design PUFs with an average intra-distance equal 
to 0%. Instead, intra-distances follow a probability distribution 
around a low value. In a similar way, average inter-distances 





Fig. 2. Response Hamming Distance distributions for PUF with (a) low 
identifiability and (b) high identifiability 
slightly different from 50%. To be identifiable, the necessary 
condition is that the intra-distances must be smaller than the 
inter-distances with a high probability. 
As an example, Fig. 2a shows a possible probability 
distribution of the Hamming Distances in a PUF. As it can be 
seen, if the measured Hamming Distance between two responses 
is 3 or 4 bits, it can be difficult to identify whether the responses 
correspond to the same PUF instance (in which case we would 
be measuring the intra-distance) or to a different PUF instance 
(in which case, we would be measuring the inter-distance). In 
this example, the PUF presents a low identifiability. On the other 
hand, if the probability distribution of the intra-distances and 
inter-distances almost do not overlap (Fig 2b), the identifiability 
is high.  
E. Physical unclonability 
A PUF presents physical unclonability if an attacker or even 
the authorized manufacturer cannot influence the creation 
procedure of the PUF to create two instances with a similar 
behavior. More precisely, if it is not possible to create two 
different PUF instances whose inter-distance is smaller than the 
average inter-distance with a high probability. This can be 
expressed informally as: it is easy to create a random PUF 
instance but hard to create a specific one [7]. 
This property distinguishes PUFs from other constructions 
such as block ciphers or public-key signatures and, along with 
the identifiability property is used to defined the concept of PUF. 
The importance of this property relies on the fact that it is not 
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process cannot be influenced to prevent each instance from 
being unique. 
F. One-wayness 
A PUF has one-wayness if it is difficult to invert. More 
precisely, given a PUF instance and a response, it is difficult to 
find a challenge that produces that response. In the classic 
definition of one-way functions, this property implies that the 
relationship between the inputs and outputs is complex so it is 
difficult to find an algorithm that is able to invert the function. 
However, in the case of PUFs, the one-wayness property also 
implies that the number of challenge-response pairs is big since, 
otherwise, an attacker could exhaust all the challenge-response 
pairs and create a lookup table that could be used to invert any 
response.  
Although the first PUF proposed by Pappu [5] presented this 
property and he called his structure Physical One-Way Function, 
most of the PUFs proposed nowadays do not present this 
property. Furthermore, this property is not needed for most PUF 
security applications [8]. 
G. Mathematical and True Unclonability 
A PUF presents Mathematical Unclonability if an attacker 
cannot predict the response of a random challenge, after having 
access to a big amount of challenge-response pairs. This 
property requires that the challenge set is large (typically 
escalates exponentially with some parameter such as the 
implementation area). Furthermore, it requires that an attacker 
cannot create an algorithm able to model the PUF from a set of 
challenge-response pairs. This property is difficult to achieve 
since most of the PUFs proposed so far have been proven to be 
vulnerable to machine learning attacks that are capable of 
modeling their behavior [9], [10].  
The combination of mathematical and physical unclonability 
makes a PUF truly unclonable.  
H. Tamper Evidence 
Finally, a PUF presents tamper evidence when it is difficult 
to physically make small modifications in the behavior of a PUF 
instance. In the ideal case, any attempt to modify the behavior 
of a PUF instance results in a completely different behavior 
undistinguishable from a new unique PUF instance. 
III. APPLICATIONS 
A. Identification and Authentication 
Although some authors use identification and authentication 
as synonyms [11], other works make a distinction between both 
terms that we will use in this manuscript [7]. According to this 
approach, identification consists of stating the identity of an 
entity, without giving any proof. On the other hand, 
authentication is a stronger property that requires a proof of the 
identity of the entity. In other words, when a verifier needs to 
verify the identity of an entity, this entity must provide some 
proof of its identity (i.e., some secret that only that entity could 
know).  
Using PUFs for identification purposes is not 
straightforward since, as explained before, PUF responses are 
not random uniformly distributed (average inter-distances are 
not 50%) and they are not reproducible when measured several 
times (intra-distances are not 0%). This is called a fuzzy 
behavior [12].  
In a typical identification application, an identification 
threshold is used. This way, if the distances between two 
measured responses is below that threshold, both responses are 
considered to come from the same PUF instance. Otherwise, 
they are considered to come from different PUF instances. 
However, due to the probabilistic distribution of the intra-
distances and inter-distances, it is possible that an identification 
error is made, specially when there is a large overlap between 
the intra-distance and inter-distances curves like in Fig. 2a.  
There are two different kind of errors. If two responses come 
from the same PUF instance but are identified as coming from 
different PUF instances the error is called false rejection. The 
probability that it happens is called False Rejection Rate (FRR). 
If two responses come from different PUF instances but are 
identified as coming from the same PUF instance, the error is 
called false acceptance. The probability that this happens is 
called False Acceptance Rate (FAR). Both rates depend on the 
chosen threshold: if a high threshold is used, the FRR is low but 
the FAR is high whereas a decrease of the threshold results in an 
increase of the FRR and a decrease of the FAR. Often, the 
threshold is chosen in a way that both FRR and FAR are equal. 
However, some applications can require a high FRR or a high 
FAR; in those cases, the threshold is chosen accordingly. 
To build a PUF-based authentication scheme, the following 
scheme is proposed in [13], [14]: 
1. First, a verifier records the identity of every entity and 
collects several random challenge-response pairs. Then the 
verifier stores in a database the challenge response pairs 
corresponding to each entity’s ID in a database. 
2. When an entity requires to be authenticated, the verifier 
picks one of the challenge-response pairs corresponding to the 
entity’s ID that have been previously stored in the database. 
Then, the verifier asks the entity for the response to that 
challenge and checks whether the response given by the entity 
is equal (or very similar) to the response stored in its database.  
The main drawback of this scheme is that, if the PUF can be 
mathematically cloned, the verifier cannot distinguish the real 
entity from an attacker with a mathematical clone of the PUF. 
Therefore, this scheme only works for PUFs that are 
mathematically unclonable (true unclonable PUFs). For PUFs 
that are not mathematically unclonable, there are some 
alternative schemes such as the one proposed in [15]. A common 
approach of these schemes consist of applying a hash function 
to the responses and comparing these hashes instead of the 
responses. Since the responses present some fuzziness, it is 
necessary to apply some kind of error-correction technique so 
that the hash function is always applied to the exact same 
response within the same PUF instance. 
B. Key Generation and Storage 
Due to their unpredictable behavior, PUFs can be a good 
alternative to generate volatile keys (i.e., only exist when the 
device is running) [16]. In addition to authentication, key 
generation and storage is the other important application of 





Fig. 3. Scheme of the process to generate secure cryptographic keys. (a) 
During an initialization phase, a helper data is produced so that the PUF always 
produce the exact same response. (b) During the key generation phase, the 
responses go through an error correction and randomness extraction function. 
PUFs. In order to generate reproducible keys, it is not possible 
to use the PUF responses directly because, as explained before, 
they are not perfectly reproducible (i.e., the response to the same 
challenge for the same PUF instance is not always exactly the 
same). On the other hand, output responses are not always 
perfectly random and, even if they are random, sometimes the 
key requires some specific constraints that the response does not 
satisfy. To solve these two issues, responses typically go through 
the following process. 
First, they pass through an error-correction function that 
guarantees that the same PUF instances always reproduce the 
exact same responses. To achieve this, a helper data that has 
been previously generated during an initialization phase is used.  
Second, the corrected responses pass through a function that 
improves the randomness of the inputs and outputs secure 
cryptographic keys. The whole process is summarized in Fig. 3. 
IV. EXAMPLE: RO-PUF 
A ring oscillator consists of an odd number of inverters 
connected in a loop. Its output oscillates at a frequency that, 
ideally, only depends on the number of inverters. In practice, 
however, due to random variations introduced during the 
manufacturing process, the oscillation frequency of each 
oscillator is not exactly the same. Typically, a RO-PUF 
compares the frequencies of pairs of identical oscillators to 
produce the output. A common scheme is shown in [16]. As it 
can be seen, the PUF contains an array of identical ring 
oscillators, a couple of multiplexers used to select the oscillators 
and a couple of frequency counters to measure the frequency of 
each oscillator. In this case, the challenge is the selection of the 
ring oscillators to compare and the response is the result of the 
comparisons. 
Although there is a total of  possible comparisons, not all 
of them produce independent outputs (if three oscillators have 
frequencies , ,  such us >  and >  it is 
straightforward than > ). To produce independent bits, 
there are several proposals such as using each oscillator once 
(which produces /2  output bits) or comparing neighboring 
oscillators (which produces − 1 output bits) [17]. To further 
improve the reproducibility and uniqueness, some works divide 
the array in groups of  oscillators and, within each group, only 
the pair of oscillators with the largest difference in frequency is 
compared (which produces / 	 output bits) [16]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has defined the concept of PUF and presented its 
main properties as well as other properties that can be useful for 
several applications. In addition, we have discussed how to 
exploit these properties for authentication and key generation or 
storage applications. Finally, as an example, the scheme of an 
RO-PUF has been presented to illustrate how the manufacturing 
process variations of a well-known structure (a ring oscillator) 
can be used to construct a PUF. 
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